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ABSTRACT 
 
Assessing the Impact of Police Order Maintenance Units on Crime: An Application 
of the Broken Windows Hypothesis 
 
By 
 
Steven Andrew Pace 
 
Dr. William H.  Sousa, Examination Committee Chair 
Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
 
High levels of violent crime and disorder area concentrated within certain 
neighborhoods of northwest Las Vegas, Nevada.  In April 2009 a police order-
maintenance unit designed to reduce minor and major offenses was initiated in these 
areas.  Drawing on the Broken Windows Hypothesis, the unit combined detailed crime 
analysis with extensive police efforts to address specific community problems.  This 
paper discusses the implementation and impact of the police order-maintenance unit 
during its operation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Serious crimes such as homicide, shootings, robberies, stabbings, and other 
violent offenses are calls-for-service (CFS) found in many communities in the United 
States. These communities may also have problems with various incivilities such as 
graffiti, narcotics sales, prostitution, and vagrancy.  When an area contains a high 
concentration of crime or police CFS, this area may be referred to as a hotspot or problem 
area (Braga 2001).  
Police departments are tasked with developing practical strategies to reduce 
serious crime in areas that display a high volume or percentage of CFS.  One problem 
police administrators face is anticipating where this concentration of crime will be and 
how best to deploy their resources effectively to deal with it (Ratcliffe, 2010).  Because 
problem areas may consume a higher percentage of police officers handling reactive 
CFS, it could be argued that this takes time away from the officers’ ability to conduct 
proactive contacts with citizens or actually ―police‖ the neighborhoods that have more 
problems with serious offenses.  While police departments often devote substantial 
resources to ―fighting crime‖ and serious offenses, minor offenses are routinely 
overlooked and may not be given much priority. 
The priorities that citizens place on crime are often not the same as police 
departments.  A citizen’s perception or fear of crime is very real to that person.  One 
example could be a vagrant harassing an elderly woman at night on her way home as she 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
walks down a lonely sidewalk.  Vagrancy may not seem too dangerous to the police, but 
to an elderly individual walking home at night this could be very threatening.   
One theoretical (and practical) concept used in policing that is associated with 
proactive enforcement by paying special attention to minor offenses is the Broken 
Window Hypothesis (Wilson & Kelling, 1982).  The theory argues that if minor 
incivilities or disorder are more closely paid attention to then the area will become less 
susceptible (or present fewer opportunities) to violent offenses because criminals will feel 
less comfortable operating in those areas.  Also violent offenses will decrease because the 
community members of a neighborhood come to accept a certain level of informal social 
rules that are enforced.  If informal social control by the community members is to be 
reestablished, then the issue of disorder must be examined.  If not, \the informal social 
control may breakdown and members of that neighborhood may withdraw from the 
community because they are fearful. 
The theory also stresses the importance of strengthening contacts between police 
and citizens. If contact between police and citizens is strong then they may be able to 
work together to address the minor offenses as a means of dealing with potential future 
serious problems before they occur. While the Broken Windows Hypothesis is 
controversial, employing a number of officers specifically dedicated to conducting 
proactive enforcement in problem areas has been demonstrated to be effective in 
communities (Kelling & Sousa, 2001).  The Broken Window Hypothesis will be 
discussed later in detail.   
The aim of the strategy is to identify neighborhoods, public spaces, or places 
affected by a significant increase in disorder or serious crimes such as the ones discussed 
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above.  Instead of officers simply responding to CFS in these areas as reactive entities, 
squads of specially trained police officers are specifically assigned to the hotspots to do 
proactive enforcement and order maintenance in the problem area.  Normal CFS are still 
handled by the officers assigned to their respective beats however the order maintenance 
team may interact more with the citizens in the communities and get to know the 
problems indigenous to their area in an attempt to assist residents with re-establishing the 
informal social control as a means to deal with disorder and serious offenses.  
Generally, these officers deploy to an area (hotspot) and conduct proactive 
policing in an attempt to reduce disorder and crime and lower the CFS in the hotspots.  It 
is hoped that these officers will pay close attention to minor offenses so that the area will 
be less attractive for criminals to commit crimes. Also, by re-connecting with citizens, 
police may have the opportunity to learn about potential problems before they occur, 
thus, exercising a strategy of crime prevention rather than its reactive counterpart: crime 
fighting.  
The current study examines a geographical target area within Las Vegas identified 
as a hotspot by the high volume of CFS and incidents reported, then assess the 
effectiveness of Broken Windows policing on reducing the number of minor and serious 
crimes in the hotspot.  The intervention involves a Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department (LVMPD) order maintenance team that conducts proactive policing by 
increasing interactions with citizens and enforcement activities in an area identified as a 
hotspot.   
In this study, it is hypothesized that a specially designated squad of police officers 
who pay special attention to minor offenses and increase communication with citizens 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
will reduce both minor and major offenses in the target area.  Secondly, and probably 
more importantly, this experiment looks at the reduction of CFS for major offenses in the 
experimental area.  The ultimate objective in this study is to examine if there is a change 
in the targeted areas’ CFS in minor and major crimes after the deployment of a police 
order maintenance team.  This study will also attempt to support previous research on 
evaluating effective policing strategies.  Kelling and Sousa (2001) posed the question: do 
police matter? This question and related research will be further examined in subsequent 
chapters. However, the question still looms: do police have any impact on crime? Kelling 
and Sousa point out that traditional criminologist will argue that police do not matter, and 
that the cause of crime is caused by various social conditions such as poverty and racism. 
Chapter Two includes a discussion on the history of policing from the time that 
police were heavily influenced by politicians to when police began to view themselves as 
professional crime fighters.  A discussion on the emerging police technologies such as the 
use of 911 systems and their impact on policing will be reviewed.  Here, the paper looks 
at the transition from when police officers left the ―beats‖ in communities to patrolling in 
motorized vehicles and rapidly responding to CFS. This then leads into a review of how 
American modern police are now organized, again describing the effects of 911 systems 
and police operations.  Finally, Chapter Two examines the different aspects of proactive 
policing and the Broken Windows Hypothesis, which is the theory under examination in 
this study.  Further contained in this section is a discussion of order maintenance, 
proactive policing styles, zero-tolerance and the application of Broken Windows Policing 
by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) in the mid 1990s.  Chapter Three 
details how the order maintenance team was deployed to the target area and the methods 
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used in this study including a detailed description of the independent variable and 
outcome measures.  In Chapter Four, a discussion and review of the findings from the 
study and potential policy implications will be examined.  Finally, in Chapter Five, a 
discussion on potential future research projects and policing strategies will be examined, 
as well as some of the limitations of this study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 When discussing Broken Windows Policing, much confusion has occurred as to 
exactly what it represents.  Equating ideas such as zero-tolerance, saturation, and 
Community Oriented Policing are common in the current literature.  Many of these issues 
appear to be interrelated and pieces of them may fit together within a theoretical 
standpoint.  In the sections that follow, I discuss these terms and the differences between 
them.  Before I do this however, I will briefly discuss the history of policing as it relates 
to the transition from early 20
th
 century American Policing to the development of the 
Reform Strategy (Traditional Model), to the development of proactive policing concepts.   
Policing History 
Police administrators constantly face deploying a limited number of personnel to 
handle various problems within their respective jurisdictions.  The general consensus is 
that it appears there are too few personnel for the amount of problems to be solved within 
a jurisdiction.  In the current age of policing with 911 systems and crime mapping, the 
job of a police administrator is complicated and their ability to anticipate ―where to 
deploy their resources‖ is not always clear (Ratcliffe, 2008).   This may be due to the 
inherent nature of the American policing landscape, which is rooted in reactivity such as 
rapid response to CFS and generalized field investigations (Goldstein, 1979).   
Much of today’s difficulties with managing resources can be traced to policing 
decisions in the 1940s and 1950s.  With the transition of police officers conducting 
primarily foot patrols to operations in motorized vehicles during the 1950s, a disconnect 
between police and citizens occurred (Kelling & Moore, 1988).  This transition - and its 
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subsequent impact on the policing profession - has been referred to as the Traditional 
Model of Policing or the Reform Strategy and take the stance of police as ―crime 
fighters‖ (Goldstein, 1990).   
As a result of this, it could be suggested that policing has moved away from a 
preventative model to a performance-oriented culture (Ratcliffe, 2008).  This 
performance culture encourages police to go get the bad guy by making as many arrests 
and issuing as many citations as possible.  Police administrators generally equate the 
number of arrest and citations made with the idea that this alone will reduce crime and 
disorder.  Whether or not this is accurate remains questionable however this demonstrates 
the crime-fighting mentality of the performance oriented culture of policing.  
In Goldstein’s (1979) work on Problem Oriented Policing, he points out that the 
Tradition Model stresses the following factors; increasing the size of the police agency, 
random patrol across all parts of the community, rapid response to call-for-service, and 
generalized field investigations.  Eck and Maguire (2000) suggest that simply increasing 
the size of the police force does not necessarily have an effect on the overall crime rate.  
Police departments felt that implementing the strategy of randomized patrol would create 
the feeling to citizens that police were around more than they actually were (Kelling et 
al., 1974).  This brings up an interesting point about increasing patrol levels.  If there is 
empirical evidence that suggests increasing the amount of officers out on the streets on 
motorized patrol does not impact the crime rate, then what does (Kelling et al., 1974)?  
Additionally, do police even impact crime at all (Kelling & Sousa, 2001)? 
It may be better to suggest that by placing police officers in the specific areas in 
need of elevated patrol might affect the overall crime rate.  Sherman (1995) argued that 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
police may be more successful if their efforts were more focused in a specific area.  This 
idea makes sense - if the majority of incident reporting originates from a specific 
geographic area, then instead of merely having a large department with officers spread 
thinly across the landscape, it might be advantageous to have a few extra patrol units 
specifically dedicated to working a problem area.  If a large percentage of CFS are 
reported in this area and a patrol intervention had its intended effect then it may be likely 
that the overall CFS would drop at that location. Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger (1990) 
examined this closely in their research.  What they discovered was that a small 
percentage of address and street intersections (3.3 %) generated approximately 50.4 
percent of CFS in Minneapolis. We will examine this issue further when discussing some 
of the failures of the Reform Strategy.   
The Early Era of Policing 
The term ―law enforcement‖ is rather inaccurate.  This term conveys the meaning 
that police are engaged in enforcing laws the majority of the time, when rather it could be 
argued that police spend most of their shift ―policing‖ or settling disputes along with 
taking enforcement action (Sousa, 2010).  The term policing conveys a more accurate 
picture of what police actually do on a daily basis.  The meaning behind policing has 
changed over time and it could be argued that the modern American police culture 
equates the terms ―policing‖ and ―crime fighting‖ to mean the same thing. Sousa (2010) 
found when conducting field research with the New York City Police Department 
(NYPD) that officers routinely did not engage in ―enforcing laws‖. Rather police officers 
spent the majority of their time handling minor disputes and issuing verbal warnings. 
Formal enforcement action such as arrests and citations were rarely exercised.  
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In 1829, Sir Robert Peel organized the first major metropolitan police department 
in London, England.  This department was different from previous policing agencies due 
to various reasons such as its size, organization, and mission.  During this time, Peel 
believed that the first priority of a police department should be crime prevention.  
Keeping this in mind patrol officers would walk along ―beats‖ within their jurisdictions.  
It could be assumed that during this time officers and citizens developed relationships, 
and responsibility of problems were shared between both parties.  This may have been 
accomplished because the officers working the ―beats‖ were engaged enough with the 
citizens that they understood the indigenous problems of the neighborhood and were able 
to provide some type of early intervention (crime prevention) before the problem became 
bigger.  Therefore, instead of taking a reactive stance, a proactive preventative approach 
may have been adopted.  Additionally, citizens may have felt more secure and feared 
crime less in their neighborhoods because of their relationship with police and the 
―informal rules‖ established in a community.  Due to the enforcement of such ―informal 
rules‖ with the assistance of police it could be argued that citizens shared a stronger bond 
a shared commitment of problems within their neighborhood.  
This idea is further supported by Ratcliffe (2008) who notes that the primary 
mission of public policing in London during the 19
th
 century was crime prevention.  
Ratcliffe also makes reference to one of the second priorities of the police force during 
that time period: ―detection and punishment of offenders‖.  Later on, this second priority 
would become the primary focus for modern policing (Ross, 2005).  The move from a 
prevention based approached focusing on early crime prevention and problem solving 
eventually morphed into a reactive model used by several police departments today 
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(Weisburd & Eck 2004).   There are three eras in American policing. These include the 
political, reform, and community oriented eras.   
The Road to Reform  
During the 18
th 
and 19
th
 century, policing in general was intimately involved with 
the political process.  This is a far cry from the way policing is organized and viewed 
today as independent and professional organizations (Kelling & Moore, 1988).  Kelling 
& Moore attempt to illustrate in their essay that a series of decisions led the direction of 
policing from a primarily crime preventative approach to a reactive professionally 
autonomous organization that provided rapid response to serious crime.  One of the 
benefits of the change was that police organization would no longer be susceptible to 
political influence.  At first, however, political influence over policing created what is 
commonly referred to as the ―political era‖ of American policing. 
During the early days of American policing, politicians wielded power and 
authority.  Early police organizations aligned themselves closely with political leaders as 
a means to assert their legitimacy.  Because of this close relationship between the police 
and politicians; often times positions of employment were based on loyalties to certain 
political leaders (Kelling & Moore, 1988).  As a consequence, police routinely publicly 
supported certain political leaders.  This was one of several broad functions that police 
agencies conducted during the turn of the 20
th
 century.  Other services that police 
provided were more social services related, like temporary housing for immigrants, 
running food banks, and problem solving in local neighborhoods.  During this time, 
police maintained a close relationship with the communities they served (Kelling & 
Moore, 1988).  This may have been a consequence of the decentralization of policing 
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commands.  The majority of the problems in any community were solved by the local 
―beat‖ officer for that area.  The officer on this beat worked the area and as a result 
understood the problems unique to that area.  As a result of this relationship, police and 
citizens were better able to solve problems and manage disorder before it escalated.  
Kelling and Moore (1988) point out that these early policing strategies were beneficial in 
the respects that police and citizens shared the responsibility of local problems and police 
offered important social services.  They also illustrate that this era had its weakness as 
well.  Due to political influence and issues with supervision, corruption became 
commonplace.  Police often were the enforcement arm of the politicians they served.  
Brutality and illegal activity within the police ranks were tolerated and common.   
Professional Crime Fighters  
Corruption and issues surrounding control of police by political leaders had 
become a bigger issue during the early 20
th
 century.  Efforts to reform the relationships 
between police, politicians, and citizens remained largely ignored until the early 1930s.  
During the 1930s, various early police leaders such as August Vollmer and J.  Edgar 
Hoover was attempting to spread their vision of reform.  This marks the beginning of the 
―Reform Era‖.  Key issues for this reform were eliminating political influence on policing 
matters and developing centralized control of personnel (Kelling & Moore, 1988).  With 
this effort, it was hoped that police organizations would become professional autonomous 
agencies responsible for fighting crime.  This led police to establish their own legitimacy 
as professional agencies that could address local crime issues without the authority of 
political leaders.  The police based their authority and legitimacy on enforcing laws.  This 
is the shift in policing where we can see the slow move towards crime fighting and drift 
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away from the connection police and citizens once had especially with the introduction of 
motorized patrol.  Enforcing laws became the mechanism for police to assert their 
legitimacy and the connection between police and citizens began to diminish thus 
creating a reactive policing approach.  Also during this era, focus on the ―means‖ and not 
the ―ends‖ were emphasized (Kelling & Moore, 1988).  The means consisted of 
promoting the self-interest of the agency, i.e. formal training, better equipment, use of 
technology, and organizational management, rather than the ends (the quality of services 
provided by police) centralized control over personnel also marked part of this reform.  
Police argued that by increasing the effectiveness of the police organization (i.e. the 
means) would better enable police to respond to crime.  As observed later, this became a 
problem because police began to lose important connections with citizens.  Once these 
connections evaporated shared responsibility of neighborhood disorder problems now 
became the sole responsibility of the citizens because police were ―too busy‖ handling 
serious felony crimes and putting the bad guy in jail.  
Because the mission of police now was primarily to enforce laws, they began to 
move towards a management of crime philosophy where they were viewed as ―law 
enforcement‖ entities with a narrow focus, and as a result, prevention of crime was no 
longer a priority.  The mindset of police now was they were there to enforce the laws, and 
problem management was not their responsibility or it was viewed as a social service 
problem.  With the acceptance of the new professional policing model, centralized 
control of personnel and record keeping of activities became important (Kelling & 
Moore, 1998).  The primary mission of police was now to enforce laws and apprehend 
criminals.  Only a hundred years before with the introduction of the London Metropolitan 
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Police Department was this new philosophy seen as the second priority with prevention 
of crime being the first.  Now the order of priorities had been switched.  This may have 
been a consequence of the various policing decisions that occurred during the early and 
mid 20
th
 century.  
The Reform Strategy 
From the 1930s to 1960s American policing was rapidly changing. Police no 
longer relied on local politicians to gain legitimacy. Now the focus of policing was to 
enforce laws and fight crime. During this era, several new strategies and technologies 
would become available to police. One strategy police began to utilize was having 
officers rapidly respond to CFS across a larger geographic area. The technology that 
aided police in accomplishing this task was removing officers from foot patrols to driving 
in motorized vehicle. This became known as ―rapid response‖ to CFS and is a major 
component of the Reform Model of policing. Another focus in this era was the attempt by 
police to centralize their organization. Having a centralized chain of command and 
organization allowed police administrators to further gain legitimacy as an independent 
entity and distance their profession from any political influence.  Another technology that 
was introduced in this era was the use of 911 systems. This would further impact the 
distance created between police and citizens because it further eliminated 
communication.  Various problems have been associated with the reform model. One 
such problem is the belief that rapidly responding to CFS would allow to catch criminal 
in the act of committing a crime and as a consequence lower crime. There have been a 
few studies that have challenged this assumption. One study concluded that the rapid 
response component has had little impact on overall crime or even the chances of making 
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an arrest (Weisburd, 2004).  Rapid response is reactive in nature and plays up the ―crime 
fighting‖ mentality of American modern policing.  
Transition from Foot Patrols to Motorized Patrol 
 As mentioned earlier, police officers were responsible for conducting foot patrols 
within their respective beats.  It is plausible that while conducting their patrols on foot 
they routinely interacted with the local residents of that area.  From this we may be able 
to imply that a bond or relationship formed which fostered communication of local 
problems.  Because police understood the problems of an area, they could assist the 
residents in negotiating the rules of that neighborhood (Wilson & Kelling, 1982).  With 
the invention of various technological advances and subsequent decisions in policing to 
make the field ―more professional‖ new technologies were introduced to facilitate this 
emerging change, which assisted in the movement towards ―reactive response‖ (Kelling 
& Moore, 1988).   
One such new tool for police to utilize was motorized patrol.  By removing police 
officers from foot patrols and putting them into vehicles they could more quickly respond 
to crimes as they were occurring and extend their coverage areas (Kelling & Moore, 
1988).  Police administrators also felt that this strategy would create the feeling for 
citizens and potential offenders that the police were everywhere; however research on 
unpredictable patrol patterns demonstrated this not to be the case (Kelling et al., 1974).  
The findings suggested that randomized patrol did not impact the crime rate.   
 In addition to this transition came the notion that motor vehicles would assist 
police in apprehending potential offenders because they would be able to more quickly 
respond and perhaps catch the criminal at the scene (Sparrow, Moore, & Kennedy, 1990).  
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The issue of being able to get to the scene faster to apprehend criminals was a component 
for removing officers from foot patrols and sticking them into motorized vehicles.  
Spelman and Brown (1981) argue that police response time do not impact the likelihood 
of apprehending an offender but rather the amount of time it took a citizen to report a 
crime did.  
Transition to 911 Systems  
 Another consequence of the Reform Era was the introduction of various new 
technologies.  The introduction of motorized patrol, was previously discussed and its 
impact on the relationship between citizens and police.  It is believed that after removing 
officers from foot patrols the unique connection between both parties began to erode.  
This disconnect was further enhanced with the introduction of 911 systems.  As believed 
by the police administrators of the time, this new technology would allow police to 
respond faster to the scene of a crime thus increasing the ability of police to ―get the bad 
guy‖ and ―fight crime‖.   However, as we find later though, various new studies during 
the 1970s would challenge the prevailing wisdom of rapid respond and crime fighting.  
Kelling and Coles (1996) make the argument that 911 systems drain policing resources 
and interfere with the police to deal with the root problems because 911 systems 
continually distances police from the citizens they services.   
Failure of Past Policing Strategies  
 During the mid 1970s, problems with rapid response to crime were becoming 
evident (Kelling & Coles, 1996).  Police had now reached a point were they had 
perfected the ―means‖ and making their process standard however the ends (quality 
service) were being neglected.  With the introduction of various new technologies such as 
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motorized patrol and 911 systems the ―ends‖ became less of a priority for police to 
address.  The aspect of prevention took a back seat for police because crime fighting, 
apprehending criminals, and enforcing laws was now the priority.  Aspects to examine 
and evaluate the effectiveness of police response were now in question.  It was argued 
that crime was on the rise during this time and if police were better able to handle crime 
then why were we observing the continued rise.  This marks the beginning of several 
studies that looked at the issues of response time, impact on crime, and citizen perception 
of fear.  
 Prior to discussing the implications of these studies, it is important to mention that 
during the 1960s and 1970s a few important events occurred in American policing.  The 
first is President Johnson’s 1967 Commission on Crime.  This further added legitimacy to 
the idea of rapid response to crime.  It also viewed police as ―crime fighters‖ and asserted 
that their primary function was to enforce laws and apprehend criminals (Kelling & 
Coles, 1996).  Another significant event that occurred around this time period was the 
decriminalization of several minor offenses, such as public drunkenness. 
Because police were focused on catching serious criminals in the act, minor 
offenses or quality of life issues were largely ignored.  Issues such as vagrancy, juvenile 
delinquency, and nuisance offenses were seen as a ―waste of time‖ for police, and time 
would better be spent trying to respond to the serious crime problems.  In addition these 
various legislative decisions were affecting police discretion and supporting the 
decriminalization of minor offenses.  These quality of life issues may seem minor to the 
police however citizens may view them as extremely important.  As previously 
mentioned, the priorities of police are not always the same as the citizens and because of 
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this, a lack of the understanding of the real problems in an area arises and reactive 
response becomes the prevailing model in use.   
It could be argued that if a disconnect between police and a citizen exists, then 
minor problems may not be addressed.  If such minor problems are not dealt with, then 
the quality of life issues that affect the residents in a neighborhood may reach a point 
where citizens either leave the area or withdraw.  This leaves the area more susceptible to 
further disorder related crime and then eventually serious offenses begin to emerge 
because criminals feel that if minor offenses are acceptable then serious offenses may be 
as well.  Potential offenders may feel more comfortable to commit serious offense 
because their disorder related behavior goes unchecked (Wilson & Kelling, 1982).   As 
these authors point out that like a broken window, signs of continual disorder signal to 
potential offenders that such behavior is tolerable and the informal social control of the 
area is weak.  Broken windows will be discussed later in the sections to follow.   
Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment  
Difficulties with random police patrol have been documented elsewhere, 
including the Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment (Kelling, 1974).  The 
experiment revealed that simple random preventative patrol had no effect on the crime 
rate.  Kelling (1974) found that in both the control and experimental area revealed that 
elevated patrol levels did not reveal a decrease in crime.  There has been much confusion 
about the outcome of this experiment.  Citizens did not notice a difference in elevated 
patrol levels. As mentioned above, these findings suggested that more police presence in 
an area did not necessarily cause a reduction in crime (Radtke, 2008).  This leads to the 
obvious conclusion that an evaluation of such policy needs to be examined in order to 
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continuously develop better policing tactics with the goal of reducing crime and its 
impacts on a community.  
Preventative Patrol 
 In light of the strategies used under the Reform Model of policing such as 
randomized patrol and rapid response, the discussion now turns to some new techniques 
used by police departments that do more than just react to the community and crime.  
These concepts include directed patrol, proactive patrol, and community oriented 
policing.  The idea with these concepts is to be a proactive entity in the community 
versus waiting for crime to happen and responding to it.  As a consequence of some of 
the various studies examining the effectiveness of policing, begin to emerge, a move 
towards working with citizens and looking at problem solving became more prevalent in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s.  This marks the move into the Community Policing Era.  
What follows is a discussion of these strategies and how they have been employed in 
police agencies. 
Directed Patrol 
 Directed efforts to ―fight crime‖ are a tactic employed by many police agencies.  
As previously mentioned, empirical evidence has demonstrated that crime can sometimes 
be localized to a specific geographic area (Braga, 2001).  If the majority of incident 
reporting over an entire jurisdiction originates from a specific geographic area then 
special attention to this location may be warranted.  Braga (2001) also indicates that 
focused police intervention in a localized area may result in ―meaningful reductions in 
crime and disorder‖.  LVMPD employs directed patrol units to areas that appear to have 
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higher incident reporting, however these units rarely spend a substantial amount of time 
in any one area - therefore the chances of any measurable success may be limited. 
Proactive Patrol 
Proactive patrol refers to officer initiated activity.  This means that instead of 
simply responding to an event an officer may observe and create an event themselves.  
This could range from a vehicle stop to observing a person selling narcotics.  Proactive 
patrol in this case may be equated with zero-tolerance (Sherman, 1997).  By this I mean 
that some departments use this strategy to enforce any infraction of the law they observe.  
This can be observed when police conduct traffic enforcement on a highway. Confusion 
can arise when discussing this terms and opponents of the Broken Windows theory often 
argue that zero-tolerance is the same thing as broken windows (Grien, 1999).  This is 
false due to the fact that discretion on the part of the officers is very important with 
Broken Windows (Wilson & Kelling, 1982).   
Sousa (2010), for example, found that often-formal sanctions such as an arrest 
were not made by officers employing broken windows policing. Regaining informal 
social control and allowing the residents of a neighborhood to not fear taking action on 
disorder is more in line with what the Broken Windows Theory encompasses.  Zero-
tolerance limits the discretion of its officers and pushes for prosecution of every offense.  
In the 1990s the Bratton administration adopted the broken windows philosophy and it 
appeared to be somewhat successful however there have been critics of what actually 
caused the reduction in crime during this time period. 
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Community Oriented Policing 
Recent research has indicated that when police organizations partner with the 
community it may lower the level of reported citizen fear (Weisburd, 2004).  Community 
Oriented policing programs began to emerge in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  This 
approach took into account that citizens have an opportunity to take informal action to 
maintain some social control in their neighborhoods.  Radtke (2008) points out that an 
example of this includes neighborhood watch programs.  By creating a sense of 
partnership with the police it may be suggested that people fear reporting criminal 
incidents less.  It may also promote a better sense of informal social control over the 
community.  It could also be argued that if a community has a good system of informal 
social control then they will be more apt to report the minor incivilities that occur in their 
neighborhood.  If this is the case then it may be possible to suggest that there is a link 
between minor incivilities and serious offenses when it come to citizens level of fear to 
report incidents.   
Broken Windows 
The idea of selecting an area high in crime and employing teams of police officers 
to conduct proactive enforcement is an idea that dates back to early modern American 
Policing.  However, a theory was not formally introduced until the 1980s. Broken 
Window’s Theory maintained the hypotheses that if an area is infested by high volumes 
of crime or CFS and is left untouched, then the area will remain relatively in the state that 
it is currently in or may decline even further and succumb to more criminal activity.  The 
theory, developed by Wilson and Kelling (1982), claimed that if petty or misdemeanor 
crimes were addressed then major crimes may be prevented.  Wilson and Kelling 
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explained this by arguing that if there was a severe lack of informal social control in a 
neighborhood then the residents in this area would not act or report crime due to various 
reasons such as fear.  This could be attributed to citizens leaving the area or because the 
good citizens who are there become afraid to report any criminal activity.  As a result of 
these two factors it may be suggested that the level of minor incivilities may increase to a 
certain threshold where the area is now more susceptible to major serious offenses 
because the criminals in the area feel more comfortable to commit their offense without 
fear of being caught.  Therefore the area succumbs to more criminal activity as a result of 
the lack of informal social control and the acceptance of further criminal activity in that 
particular neighborhood.  
As mentioned earlier, this idea of Broken Windows policing can be traced back 
even further.  In 1829, Sir Robert Peel reorganized the London Metropolitan Police 
Department and assigned officers for foot patrol to ―beats‖ or geographical locations in 
the city.  The officers were responsible for maintaining a visible presence in the areas and 
working with the local ―beat‖ populace in an effort to deter crime.  From this it may be 
suggested that the people were not actually any safer by merely the presence of a police 
officer but that they felt safer and were more apt to report minor incivilities in their 
neighborhood because they were not afraid of any potential repercussions (Kelling, 
Deickman, Pate, & Brown, 1974). 
Much has changed since the days of conducting foot patrols however the core 
fundamental concept remains unchanged, to deter criminal activity and improve the 
quality of life in communities.  In 1990 Police Chief William Bratton of the New York 
City Police Department adopted the Broken Windows philosophy to policing.  With the 
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assistance of New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, the city transitioned to a broken 
windows mentality in 1993 and improved the methods of arrest procedures and 
processing for criminals.  As a result of the police department aggressively enforcing 
misdemeanor laws, a reduction in crime began to emerge (Kelling & Sousa, 2001).  The 
crime decline in New York during the mid 1990s will be discussed further in sections to 
come.  One issue that should be made clear is that Zero Tolerance Policing is not the 
same thing as Broken Windows Policing.  Broken Windows is a proponent of officer 
discretion while Zero Tolerance is not (Sousa, 2010). 
It was assumed based on Broken Windows theory that if police paid attention 
minor incivilities, then major offenses may be decrease by such actions and therefore a 
change in the area would be seen. The idea that high visibility of police presence and 
proactive enforcement may create an atmosphere of deterrence is one small aspect of 
what the Broken Windows Theory encompasses.  
Regaining informal social control over the area by its residents is another critical 
component of the theory.  In order to assess the effectiveness of police saturating an area 
while practicing Broken Windows Policing, it is paramount to conduct experiments that 
evaluating the policies implemented by the department utilizing this type of proactive 
strategy.  This allows for the empirical evidence obtained by the research to either lend or 
not lend credit back to the theory it originated from.  More importantly, it allows the 
police to determine if their actions are effective or not.  Finally, Broken Windows 
Policing provides the theoretical framework to conduct this study. 
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Paying Attention to Disorder 
Kelling and Coles (1996) point out that there may be a certain point where 
disorder may begin to heavily saturate an area that the neighborhood may now be more 
susceptible to serious offenses.  If issues of disorder are addressed then serious offenses 
may be prevented.  Police may be able to assist citizens to reestablish the ―informal rule‖ 
of the community by expressing that certain behavior is unacceptable.  It is suggested that 
police may be able to accomplish this by enforcing minor offenses or paying attention to 
disorder.  Kelling and Sousa (2001) reveal in their research while conducting ride-a-longs 
with the various precincts at the NYPD that officers routinely would use methods that did 
not involve enforcement action.  Instead, the majority of what their activity consisted of 
was informally handling and solving problems in the neighborhoods they patrolled by 
communicating and assisting citizens in regaining informal social control over their 
neighborhood.  
Order Maintenance 
 The notion of Order Maintenance is the mechanism by which police may employ 
Broken Windows in the field.  Order Maintenance consists of paying attention to disorder 
and attempting to address the quality of life issues that affect the citizens in an area.  This 
may include problem solving with citizens in an area.  Issues such as vagrancy, narcotics 
use, or juvenile delinquency are some issues that may be addressed by both police and 
citizens.  This sense of partnership while working together in an area may curb disorderly 
behavior in an attempt to decrease the frequency of the nuisance events and prevent 
opportunities for serious offenses to occur.  
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Zero Tolerance 
 Zero Tolerance emphases the enforcement of any offense and does not distinguish 
between minor and serious offenses.  It does not matter what the severity of the crime is 
as long as enforcement action is administered.  The problem with this is that it is one 
labor intensive and two it is impossible to arrest everyone for everything.  Additionally, 
use of such a policy may not last that long.  The question then becomes what happens to 
an area after the Zero Tolerance policy is discontinued?  Research on hotspots reveals 
that police crackdowns are rather ineffective after the police intervention is discontinued 
(Sherman, 1990).  It is suggested that after the intervention is discontinued then the same 
problems reemerge.  
An example of this could be related to narcotics sales.  If police come into an area 
to conduct Zero Tolerance policing and begin to take everyone to jail for everything, drug 
dealers may simply walk across the street (displace) and sell their drugs on that street 
corner.  The issue is narcotics and if you only focus on making arrest and issuing 
citations police may only temporarily displace the problem.  Zero Tolerance has also 
been referred to as the ―bullying style‖ of policing and a means for police to target 
minorities.  Zero Tolerance is commonly associated with the Broken Windows Theory 
however as mentioned previously they are very different.  Broken Windows encourages 
high discretion and problem solving while Zero Tolerance discourages police discretion.   
Hot Spots  
Clustering of crime in public spaces continues to be a continual problem in 
dealing with disorder and serious offenses.  Weisburd (2000) suggests that the majority of 
crime may occur in a relatively small area.  Weisburd asserts that if this concept is 
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understood then police may be able to deal with the problem from a proactive nature by 
employing various methods and problem oriented policing strategies.  This approach 
allows police to slowly move away from the notion of randomized patrol across 
jurisdictions.  When police know where the problems are specifically they can then 
develop proactive preventative strategies to address serious and disorder offenses in 
public spaces.  Spelman and Brown (1984) concluded that police response times did not 
increase the likelihood of catching a criminal in that act.   
What did matter was the amount of time it took for a citizen to report the crime.  
If a citizen is afraid to report a crime or is withdrawn the chances of apprehension are 
limited.  Focusing on specific geographic locations where crime is occurring and paying 
attention to the problems unique to the area (i.e. the quality of life issues) may impact the 
crime and the individual’s perception or fear of crime in the area (Kelling et. al. 1974).   
Criminologists have generally agreed that a hot spot is an area with elevated 
criminal incidents and a heightened risk for victimization (Eck, 2005). Past research has 
demonstrated that a small percentage of individuals may be responsible for a large 
percentage of crime in an area (Sherman, 1997).  As mentioned previously, this is 
suggested in a study conducted in Minneapolis looking at the incident reporting for street 
address in an area.  It was discovered that 50.4 percent of the total number of incidents 
generated came from a relatively small number of persons reporting, approximately 3 
percent (Sherman, Gartin, & Buerger, 1989).   
What he found was that recent research has indicated that police are becoming 
more accepting of the idea of focusing a specific police intervention in a very specific 
geographical region by using policing crackdowns or hot spot policing.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
Intervention/Hypothesis 
This study is a test of the Broken Windows Hypothesis.  An LVMPD ―order 
maintenance team‖ operated in a target area for a period of 84 days and performed order 
maintenance functions.  It was hypothesized that after the deployment of the team, three 
things would happen. First, officer self initiated field activity would increase (SIFA). 
Secondly, there would be an observed reduction in minor and major crimes from pre-
intervention time’s verses post-intervention times and third this change would not be 
observed in the control groups or other comparisons. If this were the outcome, it could be 
suggested that the treatment (the police intervention) produced the observed effect in the 
experimental group.  This may be plausible because past research has suggested that a 
small area may account for the majority of crime and that if police focus their attention to 
these ―hot spots‖ then a reduction in overall crime may be reduced (Sherman 1995).  
The order maintenance team was selected by the bureau commander of LVMPDs 
North West Area Command (NWAC). An existing police squad familiar with the 
experimental area, already operating in NWAC was chosen by the bureau commander. 
The police squad was then designated as NWAC’s order maintenance team in April 2009 
Training was conducted with the order maintenance team prior to their 
deployment to the experimental area operating under the new order maintenance 
mandate.  The team was provided with an extensive lecture on Broken Windows 
Policing, order maintenance, and the mandate which they were operating under.  
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The mandate for the order maintenance team consisted of communicating to the 
officers that their purpose for being deployed to the experimental area was to learn the 
unique problems of that area. The team was told that some of the ways they could 
accomplish this task was to more frequently communicate with citizens in the area and 
attempt to learn where the problem address were and who the prolific offenders in the 
area were. The order maintenance team was also told that they did not have to meet a 
quota for arrest or citations. The team was instructed on the difference between zero 
tolerance and Broken Windows in terms of appropriate enforcement actions. It was 
explained to the team that informal actions such as a warning would be appropriate for 
situations they deemed to use it in. They also were told that when conduction officer self 
initiated field activity such as vehicle and person stops to keep the informal/formal 
enforcement options.  
If a reduction in minor and serious offenses is observed in the target area after the 
team deploys, we may conclude with a degree of certainty that if order maintenance is 
used by police as a proactive strategy to address minor offenses then there may be a 
relationship between these efforts. The targeting of minor offenses through aggressive 
enforcement coupled with order maintenance may cause a reduction in major crimes 
which would in turn lend support to the originating hypothesis.  
  It is hypothesized that a reduction in the CFS or major crimes will be attributed 
to proactive enforcement of minor crimes, increases in SIFA, and most importantly the 
activities of the police order maintenance team. Comparison of means tests are utilized in 
analysis of the data collected.  The following research questions examined for this study 
are as follows: 
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Hypothesis 1:  Proactive policing (i.e., Broken Windows) on the part of the order 
maintenance team will lead to an increase in proactive enforcement activity within the 
target area.  This hypothesis corresponds to the first outcome / dependent variable, i.e. 
enforcement activity as measured by self-initiated field activity (SIFA). 
Hypothesis 2:  Proactive policing on the part of the order maintenance team will lead to a 
decrease in minor offenses in the target area.  This hypothesis corresponds to a second 
outcome / dependent variable, i.e. minor offenses as measured by calls for service for 
minor offense codes. 
Hypothesis 3:  Proactive policing on the part of the order maintenance team will lead to a 
decrease in serious crime.  This hypothesis corresponds to a third outcome / dependent 
variable, i.e. serious crime as measured by reports for serious offense codes. 
Sampling 
Sampling included a geographic area identified by a high volume of violent CFS 
(major crimes) and incident reporting provided by official crime data from the LVMPD.  
The experimental and control areas were chosen based on three criteria. The first were 
the similar major and minor CFS in all areas. Secondly, the demographics that made up 
the area were similar. Third, the areas were chosen based on the experiential knowledge 
of the area by police officers that identified the hotspots chosen as places that receive a 
larger percentage of their violent CFS.   
A geographic location consisting of the areas between Vegas Blvd. and extending 
north to Cheyenne Ave. then from Jones Blvd. extending west to Rampart Blvd. 
consisted of the target area V5 and V6.  Variables that make up the sector beats such as 
mean income, race, age, and education level are similar in make-up.  Crime rates also 
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appeared to be closely similar in reference to CFS generated and based on the 
experiential knowledge on the area by police and the CFS from 2006 and 2007 (see 
Table’s 1 and 2). 
 
 
Table 1 
 
  Major and Minor CFS 2006 
 
   Area  Major Crimes  Minor Crimes  
Experimental        488      6,146 
   W Control      309    4,147 
   U Control       470     4,170 
 
Note:  Information obtained from LVMPD’s official crime records  
 
 
Table 2 
 
  Major and Minor CFS 2007 
 
   Area  Major Crimes  Minor Crimes  
Experimental        473     6,880 
   W Control      290    3,875 
   U Control       358    3,875 
 
Note: Information obtained from LVMPD’s official crime records 
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Design 
 The study employed a quasi-experimental research design utilizing a pre and 
posttest approach. CFS for major and minor crimes, as well as SIFA, were examined in 
the experimental area and the comparison areas. The study employed several different 
time periods for comparison purposes and to control for seasonal effects.  The initiative 
started on April 25, 2009.  
 
 
Table 3 
 
  Time Periods  
  
   Time Period  Dates   
T1  February 3, 2008-April 25, 2008 
T2 April 26, 2008-July 18, 2008 
T3 January 31, 2009-April 24, 2009 
T4 April 25, 2009-July 17, 2009 
 
 
Three comparisons were performed.  One comparison involved examining CFS 
and SIFA during the experimental 84-day time period (T4) compared to the previous 84-
day time period during the same year (T3).  The purpose of this step was to determine if 
change in key variables could be detected after the intervention began.  However, 
because key variables may be affected by the change from the spring months to the 
summer months within the same year, a second comparison examined CFS and SIFA 
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during the experimental 84-day period (T4) compared to the corresponding 84-day period 
during the previous year (T2).  Finally, to further examine a potential seasonal effect, the 
timeframe encompassing T3 to T4 (168 days in 2009) was compared to the 
corresponding 168 days in 2008 (T1 to T2). These comparisons were used in comparing 
both the experimental and control areas.  
This study involved a target and two comparisons. The ―target‖ area, which 
received the police intervention, is comprised of two adjacent sector beats (V5 and V6).  
The first comparison area is located just adjacent to the target area (sector beats W1 and 
W2).  These areas can be seen in Appendices I and II. Examination of this area placed 
special emphasis on observations of any potential displacement or diffusion, possibly as a 
result of the treatment. 
 The second comparison area (comprised of sector beats U1 and U3) is located 
approximately 3 to 4 miles from the target area.  This area is similar to the target area and 
the first comparison area, but its distance from the target area made the possibilities of 
displacement or diffusion unlikely.  This area served to establish general crime trends for 
comparability against the target and other comparison areas.  Both the intervention and 
control areas are similar in makeup.  They are both comprised of a mixture of business 
and low-income residential housing neighborhoods and apartment complexes. Previous 
studies in social sciences have suggested that matching different areas or controlling for 
such variables as demographics allows for more evidentiary support if a change is 
observed and that this change is as a result from the introduction of the independent 
variable (Fritsch, Caeti, & Taylor, 1999).  
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Table 4 
  
    Area Demographics  
   
     
Area  Median Age  
 Average  
Household Size  
Percent 
Higher  
Education   
Median 
Income  
Experimental      30.6       2.5    15.3 16,6565 
 
Controls      33.2      2.56    11.6 19,380 
 
        
 
Source: 2000 Census Data. U.S. Census Bureau  
 
 
The hypotheses predicted that three things would happen after the deployment of 
the order maintenance team. First there should be an increase in officer SIFA. Secondly, 
a decrease in minor offenses in the experimental area would be observed. Finally, major 
crimes would decrease in the experimental area after the deployment of the order 
maintenance team.  
Both measurements for minor and major crimes were taken simultaneously each 
day for the all time periods (T1 – T4). As mentioned earlier, CFS and SIFA were treated 
and measured as two distinct outcome variables.  Since the order maintenance team 
focused specifically on proactive enforcement and building relationships with citizens, 
we believed that crime or serious offenses would be reduced as minor incivilities are 
more closely paid attention to through aggressive enforcement action, order maintenance 
activities, more frequently communicating with citizens.   
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Both minor and major crimes were tracked through official data collected by the 
LVMPD.  SIFA in the intervention area was analyzed and compared against the other 
outcome measures (minor and major crimes).  All crimes are classified according to the 
category they fall into as defined by the Nevada Revised Statute.   
The treatment (police intervention) was introduced to the experimental area 
during T4.  The order maintenance team was not deployed to the control areas.  All areas 
involved in this study still maintained normal levels of police activity except the target 
area, which received an increased in the level of patrol presence due to the intervention.   
Data and Variables 
Independent Variable  
The treatment was defined as, the introduction of an eight-member squad of 
police officers.  The unit deployed four days a week and operated between the hours of 
2:00pm to 12:00am.  The team deployed Wednesday through Saturday.  All members 
were uniformed police officers and operated as marked patrol units (squad cars).  These 
units were single-man; therefore eight marked patrol units were operating in the target 
area during the time the team was deployed (T4).  The squad was not be mandated to 
respond to any normal CFS.  Their objective was to conduct all proactive contact with 
citizens and pay attention to minor crimes in the experimental area  
The treatment (order maintenance) was introduced on April 25, 2009 (T4).  168 
additional observational time points were taken, starting with time day one on April 25, 
2009, extending to observational time point 168 on July17, 2009 (end of T4).  The order 
maintenance team is separate from normal swing shift patrol squads, however for the 
purpose of analysis; the order maintenance team was primarily looked at for this 
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respective time slot (2:00pm to 12:00 am). Normal patrol squads continued their routine 
activities and handle CFS in all areas (intervention and controls).  
Dependent Variable  
 Self Initiated Field Activity (SIFA) 
The first of the outcomes variables measured was officer self initiated field 
activity (SIFA) in the experimental and control areas. The SIFA included vehicle stops 
(467) and person stops (468).  Due to official reporting mechanisms, we were unable to 
measure the other activity police conduct during their shift such as unofficial citizen 
contacts
1
. Self-initiated officer activity was examined in the all areas to observe if SIFA 
increased or decreased. This corresponds to hypothesis one (H1).   
 
 
Table 5  
 
   Officer Self Initiated Field Activity  
 
    Code Description    
467 Officers proactively conduct a stop on a motorized vehicle  
    468 Officers proactively conduct a stop on a person  
 
 
Minor Crimes  
                                                          
1
 Unofficial contacts with citizens were commonly understood by officers in LVMPD as 
reaching out to citizens and simply talking to them without having any probable cause to 
stop them. 
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The second outcome measure included measuring minor offenses. Minor offenses 
are categorized as the following crimes; drunk (408), fights calls (416), other disturbance 
(416B), juvenile disturbances (416A), suspicious situation (425), suspicious person 
(425A), suspicious vehicles (425B), and keep the peace (437).  The description of these 
crimes can be seen below in Table 5.   
 
 
Table 6 
 
Minor crimes included in analyses 
 
Code Description 
416 – Fight Calls Citizen calls for fight related disturbances 
416A Citizen calls for juvenile related disturbance  
416B – Other 
Disturbances 
Citizen calls for loud music call  
425 Citizen calls for a suspicious situation  
425A Citizen calls for a suspicious person   
425B Citizen calls for a suspicious vehicle   
408 Citizen calls for assistance with an intoxicated person 
437 Citizen calls for assistance with keeping the peace  
 
 
 
There were two reasons why these offenses were chosen for examination and 
classified as minor crimes in this study.  The first is that these were the most commonly 
reported CFS in the both the target and comparison areas’ jurisdiction (based on official 
LVMPD crime statistics).  Secondly, these incivilities are closely related to quality of life 
issues.  Studies have suggested that a link exists between an individual’s perception of 
their neighborhood in reference to degree of physical or social incivilities present, and 
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their reaction to this crime, which in turn may cause them to withdraw and thus make the 
area more vulnerable to serious offenses (Ferrarro, 1994; Miethe, 1995)  
 
 
Major Crimes  
 A similar scale for major crimes was utilized.  For the purpose of this study, four 
serious offenses were examined.  These offenses include the following; robbery (407), 
persons with a gun (413), homicide (420), and sexual assault (426).  These offenses were 
chosen due to the fact that the LVMPD deemed them as the most serious offenses.    
A measure of the CFS were taken at T1 to T3 prior to the deployment of the order 
maintenance team and then during T4.  This included both major and minor crimes as 
defined earlier.  SIFA was also measured during these time periods.   
Various studies have utilized before and after measurement designs, which have 
shown that a change could be measured utilizing this methodology and that it was rather 
effective (Press, 1971). 
Analytical Plan  
The data for CFS and SIFA was obtained from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department’s Department Operations Center (DOC). There were a few steps involved in 
conducting research for this study. All crime data for the experimental and control areas 
reported were collected by uniformed patrol officers handling normal CFS which was 
generated by a citizen, analyzed, and then translated in to the official crime data utilized 
by this study.   
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It was  hypothesized that a reduction in the major offenses would be observed 
after the introduction of the order maintenance team, therefore a measure of this volume 
was taken at the successive time periods both pre/post interventions to assess if a change 
occurred.  While the team was deployed, a measure of all variables, i.e. major and minor 
crimes, and SIFA was taken on a daily basis to monitor their effectiveness and assess if a 
reduction occurred.  This corresponds to hypothesis one, two and three (H2 and H3).   A 
t-test was utilized to assess any changes that occurred between times.   
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CHAPTER 4 
EVALUATIONS AND FINDINGS 
Project Findings  
 The LVMPD order maintenance team was deployed to V5 and V6 for a period of 
84 days (T 4).  The treatment was the order maintenance team in the intervention area 
(V5/V6).  Their duties included a variety of functions not limited specifically to 
enforcement action.  They more frequently exited their patrol cars and communicated 
with citizens to learn about the problems that were unique to that area.  They additionally 
gained an understanding of who the continuing problem individuals and addresses were.  
The order maintenance team was specially trained on Broken Windows Policing and was 
taught the difference between their function and zero tolerance policing.   
Additionally, the team was instructed on the various aspects of order maintenance 
policing such as assisting citizens to reestablish informal social control.  Successful 
applications of order maintenance policing were discussed with the team prior to their 
deployment to the intervention area.  Some of these applications included examples from 
New York City in the 1990s (Kelling & Sousa, 2001).  They were also explicitly 
reminded that they needed to pay attention to the minor offenses and observe what the 
priorities of the citizens in the area were. 
The order maintenance team was not required to hand in a certain number of 
citations or arrest at the end of each shift.  There was no quota imposed.  Instead, the 
team was asked to interact more frequently with the residents in the intervention area to 
learn what the priorities of the citizens were.  Most often, formal enforcement action was 
substituted for informal measures such as verbal warnings. There were four different time 
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periods under examination, T1 through T4.These time periods were examined for a few 
different reasons.  For T3 and T4, the purpose was to observe what the area’s serious and 
minor offenses were prior to the introduction of the order maintenance team in the 
intervention area as well as what the control areas looked like in terms of minor and 
major CFS.  Additionally SIFA was examined pre and post intervention (T1 through T4).  
Due to the fact that a seasonal effect may influence the number of serious and minor 
offenses reported from a winter to summer time period, the previous year during the 
exact same time period was examined.  
Self-Initiated Field Activity 
The experiment predicted that officer self initiated field activity would increase 
after the introduction of the police order maintenance team. This corresponded with 
hypothesis one. SIFA was an outcome variable examined in both the comparison and 
experimental areas. It was observed that SIFA had a significant increase in the 
experimental and control areas when comparing the T2 to T4 (see Table 9). This increase 
demonstrated that SIFA did increase after the deployment of the order maintenance team.  
Table 7 compares SIFA for T1 and T2. In the experimental area, SIFA decreased 
by 7.1 percent. In W control SIFA decrease by 17.8 percent between T1 and T2.  In the U 
comparison area, a slight increase in SIFA was observed by 0.4 percent.  None of these 
results indicated any statistical significance.   
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Table 7 
 
Self Initiated Field Activity (SIFA) Time Period 1 and 2  
 
   T1 T 2  Percent 
Change  
Experimental  Total  708 658  -7.1% 
  Mean per day 8.43 7.83    
        
W Control  Total  373 311  -17.8% 
  Mean per day 4.5 3.7    
        
U Control  Total  423 425  0.4% 
  Mean per day 5.4 5.06    
            
 
Note: t-tests revealed that the SIFA change for the experimental, W, and U controls were 
not statistically significant from period 1 to 2.  
Time period 1 was January 08 – April 08. Time period 2 was April 08 – July 08. 
 
 
Table 8 displays SIFA activity for T 3 and T4.  The SIFA for the experimental 
area showed an increase by 1.2 percent from T3 to T4.  In the W control area, SIFA 
showed a decrease 17 percent.  U control displayed an increase in SIFA by 7.7 percent 
from T3 to T4.  
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Table 8 
 
Self Initiated Field Activity (SIFA) Time Period 3 and 4 
 
   T 3 T 4  Percent 
Change  
Experimental  Total  1147 1161  1.2% 
  Mean per day 13.65 13.82    
        
W Control  Total  559 464  -17.0% 
  Mean per day 6.65 5.52    
        
U Control  Total  686 739  7.7% 
  Mean per day 8.17 8.8    
            
Note: t-tests revealed that the SIFA changes for the experimental, W and U controls were 
not statistically significant for period 3 and 4.  
Time period 3 was January 09 – April 09. Time period 4 was April 09 – July 09. 
 
 
 
  Table 9 displays SIFA comparing T2 to T4. During the course of T4, in the 
intervention area, an increase in SIFA was observed.  When comparing T2 and T4 in 
Table 9, an increase in the SIFA activity was observed by 76.6 percent in the 
experimental area.  A t-test revealed that these results were statistical significant.  The 
same trend was seen in both comparison areas as well.  In W control area, SIFA was up 
by 49.2 percent. In U control, SIFA increased by 59.7 percent. One reason there may 
have been such a significant increase of SIFA in the control areas is from other initiatives 
that may have been taking place at the same time this experiment was going.  
One such experiment is the Safe Village Initiative that took place in Bolden Area 
Command where W and U control areas where located. This was a strategy that was 
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implemented to reduce violent offenses and focused on increasing police visibility, 
enforcement actions, and community outreach in Bolden Area Command. This differs 
from the current strategy due to the order maintenance component. The Safe Village will 
be briefly discussed in the next chapter.   
 
 
Table 9 
 
Self Initiated Field Activity (SIFA) Time Period 2 and 4 
 
   Time Period 2 Time Period 4  Percent 
Change  
Experimental  Total  658 1161  76.6%* 
  Mean per day 7.83 13.83    
        
W Control  Total  311 464  49.2%* 
  Mean per day 3.7 5.52    
        
U Control  Total  452 739  59.7%* 
  Mean per day 5.06 8.08    
            
Note: *Statistically significant p < .001 
Time period 2 was April 08 – July 08. Time period 4 was April 09 – July 09. 
 
 
Minor Offenses in the Target Area 
It was hypothesized that minor offenses would go down after the introduction of 
the order maintenance team.  In both the intervention and control areas the number of 
minor offenses varied throughout all four time periods.  The reason these specific minor 
offenses were chosen was because they were the most commonly reported in both the 
experimental and control areas.  Additionally, previous research on Broken Windows 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
Policing has indicated that the various minor incivilities chosen may be consistent with 
what citizens routinely viewed as problematic to them such as the ones selected in this 
study. It was observed that minor offenses increased when comparing T2 to T4.  
 
 
Table 10 
 
Minor Offenses Time 1 and 2 
 
   T1 T 2  Percent 
Change  
Experimental  Total  1785 1936  8.5% 
  Mean per day 21.25 23.05    
        
W Control  Total  919 1049  14.1% 
  Mean per day 10.94 12.49    
        
U Control  Total  1064 1014  -3.0% 
  Mean per day 6.44 7.17    
            
Note: t-tests revealed none of the groups yielded statistically significant results. 
Time period 1 was January 08 – April 08. Time period 2 was April 08 – July 08. 
 
 
As consistent with what would normally be observed in the transition from the 
winter to summer months, Table 10 displays a seasonal effect which is observed in the 
experimental area and W control from T1 to T2.  Table 4 displays CFS for minor 
offenses. The experimental area showed an increase by 8.5 percent from T1 to T2. In W 
control there was an observed increase by 14.1 percent in CFS for minor offenses. U 
control showed a decrease of 3.0 in CFS for minor offenses from T1 to T2.  
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Table 11 displays CFS for minor offenses comparing T3 through T4.  An increase 
of 7.8 percent in CFS for minor offenses was observed in the intervention area. This 
could be an indication of a seasonal effect. Another explanation could be that with the 
order maintenance strategy, citizens may have felt as though officers were more 
accessible for reporting the minor quality of life offenses that bothered them.  In W 
control, CFS for minor offense increased by 3.2 percent while U control also showed an 
increase in CFS for minor offenses by 2.7 percent. 
 
 
Table 11 
 
Minor Offenses Time 3 and 4 
 
   T3 T4  Percent 
Change  
Experimental  Total  1852 1994  7.8% 
  Mean per day 22.05 23.74    
        
W Control  Total  986 1018  3.2% 
  Mean per day 11.74 12.12    
        
U Control  Total  1084 1113  2.7% 
  Mean per day 6.75 7.21    
            
Note: t-tests revealed none of the groups yielded statistically significant results. 
Time period 3 was January 09 – April 09. Time period 4 was April 09 – July 09. 
 
 
Table 12 compares T2 to T4. There is an increase in minor offenses from T2 to 
T4 in the intervention area by 3.0 percent.  This may be explained by arguing that as the 
order maintenance team became more accessible to the public, citizens felt more able to 
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report more minor crimes. There is also an increase in the mean number of reported 
minor offenses by 9.8 percent in U control area.  W control area observed a decrease in 
minor CFS by 3.0 percent. 
 
 
Table 12 
 
Minor Offenses Time 2 and 4 
 
   T2 T4  Percent 
Change  
Experimental  Total  1936 1994  3.0% 
  Mean per day 23.05 23.74    
        
W Control  Total  1049 1018  -3.0% 
  Mean per day 12.49 12.12    
        
U Control  Total  1014 1113  9.8% 
  Mean per day 7.17 7.21    
            
Note: t-tests revealed none of the groups yielded statistically significant results. 
Time period 2 was April 08 – July 08. Time period 4 was April 09 – July 09. 
 
 
Serious Offenses in the Target Area 
Serious offenses that were tracked in both the intervention and control areas were 
the LVMPD’s index crimes and consisted of; homicide, robbery, sexual assault, and 
assaults with a gun.   
Table 13 displays CFS for serious offenses in all 3 areas from T1 to T2. From T1 
through T2 there was a decrease in the mean average number of offenses per day in both 
comparison areas. In W control, serious CFS showed a decrease between T1 and T2 by   
8.6 percent. In U control there was a decrease in serious CFS by 3.0 percent. The 
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experimental area showed an increase in serious CFS from T1 to T2 by 14.2 percent.  It is 
somewhat unusual for a decrease to be observed from a winter to summer time period as 
seen in both W and U control areas from T1 to T2.  Often times, a seasonal effect is 
observed when going from a winter to summer time period.  A seasonal effect is when 
there is a slight increase in the number of reported offenses from one time period to 
another (summer to winter months).  The experimental area displayed a more traditional 
pattern, as the area transitioned from winter to summer months, CFS increased by 14.2 
percent. Several factors could explain the decrease observed in W control area. For 
example the commander at Bolden Area Command (which is where W and U control are 
located) may have had some initiatives going on during these time periods.  This was 
before the introduction of the order maintenance police team to the intervention area.   
 
 
Table 13 
 
Serious Offenses Time 1 and 2 
 
    T1 T2 Percent 
Change  
Experimental  Total  85 97 14.2% 
  Mean per day 1.01 1.15   
       
W Control  Total  49 45 -8.6% 
  Mean per day 0.58 0.54   
       
U Control  Total  67 65 -3.0% 
  Mean per day 0.8 0.77   
Note: t-tests revealed none of the groups yielded statistically significant results.  
Time period 1 was January 08 – April 08. Time period 2 was April 08 – July 08. 
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In Table 14, CFS for serious offenses is compared between T3 and T4. W control 
area showed an increase in serious offense by 50 percent during this time comparison (T3 
to T4) while the intervention area observed a decrease in serious CFS by 1.3 percent.  U 
control showed a 30.8 percent increase from T3 to T4. It appeared as though a traditional 
seasonal effect did not take place in the experimental area during this time period.  
 
 
Table 14 
 
Serious Offenses Time 3 and 4 
 
   T3 T 4  Percent 
Change  
Experimental  Total  80 79  -1.3% 
  Mean per day 0.95 0.94    
        
W Control  Total  38 57  50.0% 
  Mean per day 0.45 0.68    
        
U Control  Total  52 68  30.8% 
  Mean per day 0.62 0.81    
            
Note: t-tests revealed none of the groups yielded statistically significant results. 
Time period 3 was January 09 – April 09. Time period 4 was April 09 – July 09. 
 
 
Table 15 displays compares T2 and T4. The experimental area observed a 
reduction in serious offenses by 18.3 percent when comparing T2 to T4. A t-test revealed 
that this was not statistically significant
2
.  During this same time frame an increase in 
                                                          
2
 At the p <.10 level, a t-test revealed statistical significance in the intervention area after 
the introduction of the order maintenance team.    
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serious offenses was observed in both control areas.  In W control area, an increase 25.9 
percent was observed.  In the U control area, an increase of 5.2 percent was also seen. 
The intervention area showed a reduction in serious CFS versus the increase observed in 
both the comparison areas. This is relevant to police leaders because they compare the 
current year’s CFS to the previous year. When comparing T2 to T4 the reduction far 
surpasses any decreases in serious offenses observed in either comparison area during 
any of the time periods. 
 
 
Table 15 
 
Serious Offenses Time 2 and 4 
 
   T 2 T 4  Percent 
Change  
Experimental  Total  97 79  -18.3% 
  Mean per day 1.15 0.94    
        
W Control  Total  45 57  25.9% 
  Mean per day 0.54 0.68    
        
U Control  Total  65 68  5.2% 
  Mean per day 0.77 0.81     
            
Note: t-tests revealed none of the groups yielded statistically significant results. 
Time period 2 was April 08 – July 08. Time period 4 was April 09 – July 09. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION  
 
Although only one of the three measures showed a statistically significant change 
in behavior, the results may suggest that deploying an order maintenance team to a very 
specific geographic location, utilizing a Broken Windows Policing strategy, may result in 
a reduction in violent offense. The underlying pattern showed that if minor crimes are 
more frequently paid attention to and an order maintenance component is implemented, 
major crimes may be reduced.  
Self Initiated field Activity (SIFA) 
Comparing self-initiated field activity during the experimental condition to 
activity one year prior, a statistically significant increase was observed. In the 
experimental area there was an increase in SIFA by 76.5 percent. Both comparison areas 
showed an increase in SIFA as well, however, but at much lower levels than seen in the 
experimental area. When comparing the time period immediately prior to the 
experimental condition, we found that SIFA in the target area increased by 1.2 percent. 
These results are important when paired with the findings that the experimental areas’ 
serious offense also decreased by 18.56 percent when comparing to rates one year prior. 
In direct contrast, both comparison areas showed an increase in serious offenses for that 
same time comparison. Hypothesis one asked the question of whether there would be an 
increase in SIFA after the introduction of the team. Based on the results, it can be 
suggested that SIFA did increase after the introduction of the order maintenance team.  
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Minor Crimes 
Minor crimes exhibited no real consistent pattern besides an increase from winter 
to summer months in most time periods. Hypothesis two predicted that minor crimes 
would decrease after the introduction of the order maintenance team. This did not occur 
when examining the period before the team and during it. There was an increase in minor 
offenses by 7.76 percent during this time period. When comparing the condition period to 
one year prior, we observed an increase by 3 percent. It could be argued that after the 
introduction of the order maintenance team, police became more accessible to the citizens 
in the experimental area. By the citizens feeling as though officers were more accessible 
then it might be feasible that they also felt more comfortable in reporting minor offenses. 
This may be why we observed the increase in minor offenses within the target area. In W 
comparison area there was a decrease by 3.24 percent in minor offenses from the period 
immediately prior to the target period and a reduction by 3 percent from the year prior. 
The order maintenance team did not operate in W control area.  
Serious Offenses 
 The results revealed some interesting findings in both the experimental and 
comparison areas.  Between the period one year prior to the target period and the 
experimental period, there was a reduction in serious offenses by 18.3 percent in the 
experimental area. This may not have yielded statistically significant results however 
police leadership was pleased with a reduction in serious offenses in the intervention 
area. In W control there was an increase in serious offenses by 26.6 percent. In U control 
there was an in serious offenses by 4.62 percent, comparing the same two periods. Just 
examining theses percents is an indication that something occurred.  
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Whether the decrease in the experimental area or subsequent increase in the 
controls where the cause of the treatment or some confounding influence is unknown due 
to the findings not revealing statistical significance. It can be argued that something 
happened and this was a decrease in serious offenses after the introduction of the order 
maintenance team. Hypothesis three predicted that serious offenses would decrease after 
the introduction of the order maintenance team in the experimental area. This was 
observed when comparing statistics in the same periods in 2008 and 2009. A similar 
pattern was revealed when examining the results of major crimes in the period 
immediately proceeding the experimental period. In the experimental area a decrease of 
1.25% was observed. W control showed an increase of 50 % while U control observed an 
increase in serious offenses by 30.77 %. These results did not reveal statistical 
significance however they demonstrate that something occurred and that a traditional 
seasonal effect was not observed between winter 2009 and spring 2009 periods for the 
experimental as in the comparison areas. This is different then what was observed the 
previous year when comparing the same Jan-April and April-July periods in 2008 for the 
experimental area. During this time period the experimental area observed an increase in 
serious offenses by 14.2 percent while both controls showed a decrease. For the 2009 
periods the opposite effect has now occurred. This poses the question of displacement.  
Displacement 
It is unknown what caused the reduction in serious offenses in the target area 
while both comparison areas showed an increase from the immediately preceeding time 
period to the target period and when comparing the prior year’s period to the target 
period. There could have been an unknown factor influencing the reduction in serious 
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offences within the experimental area and causing the increase in the comparison areas. 
Criminals may have felt less comfortable to operate in the experimental area after the 
order maintenance team arrived. It could be plausible that criminals simply displaced to 
W control area and this is why we see the increase in serious offenses. Then again, it 
could have been something else. Due to the fact that results from serious and minor 
offenses were not statistically significant it is hard to say definitively what happened. 
Based on the results diffusion is unlikely. Police leadership were pleased with the results 
and felt that any reductions were indications of success.  
Limitations 
Because this was a quasi-experiment - the sector beats, order maintenance team, 
and crime types were not chosen at random.  This study utilized a pre/post test design that 
attempted to examine whether there was a relationship between police conducting order 
maintenance and any change in SIFA, serious and minor offenses.  Because police use 
special systems to track police activity, it is very hard to capture the informal activity that 
police so frequently are engaged in such as order maintenance and relationship building.  
Most of this activity, at least for the order maintenance team consisted of re-building 
relationships with citizens and learning the quality of life offenses that consistently 
troubled the neighborhoods.   
It would have been more desirable to have the order maintenance team deployed 
to the intervention area for a longer period of time to observe what trends in the serious 
and minor offenses emerged.  The activity the order maintenance team was routinely 
conducting was very informal and non-enforcement related however they would enforce 
minor quality of life issues.  This type of activity was aimed at addressing the minor 
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offenses in the intervention area in hopes of decreasing serious crime by making the area 
less susceptible for criminals to commit future serious offenses.  
There are several limitations to this study. It is not a true random experiment, the 
areas are not exactly the same, it is hard to capture order maintenance, and we did not 
employ any surveys or conduct interviews to see how the citizens felt or if they noticed a 
change in the areas pre/post intervention.   
Recommendations for Future Research 
Give the limited amount of time the order maintenance team was deployed to the 
experimental area as well as the size of the team, it is recommended that future order 
maintenance teams deployed in LVMPD’s jurisdiction or elsewhere remain in the 
intervention area for a longer period of time.  Based on previous research and this study’s 
findings, it is advised to allow for approximately a nine to twelve month deployment of 
an order maintenance team to the intervention area.  This longer time frame would allow 
for a more comprehensive analysis and more data points to measure.  It would also be 
suggested to include a citizen satisfaction survey to both the intervention and control 
areas prior to and after the team had deployed to the experimental area. Additionally, 
some type of measure should be developed to capture the order maintenance activity that 
future teams would be engaged in.  
Conclusion 
Previous research on Broken Windows Policing suggests that if minor offenses 
are more closely paid attention to then as a result serious offenses may decrease as well 
(Kelling & Coles, 1996).  This is evident in New York City with the implementation of 
the Broken Windows Policing philosophy to address minor offenses in the subway 
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systems as well as other areas in the city.  Violent crime is still trending down in these 
areas.  This research has shown that order maintenance police units may be a more 
effective approach at reducing violent crime in areas than simply arresting and citing 
everyone.  That is zero tolerance policing and what has been commonly practiced at 
LVMPD.  This experiment was brief however it demonstrated that if officers were trained 
in order maintenance policing they could still go to an area and operate just as effective if 
not more while serious offenses were being reduced even if the reduction was not 
statistically significant.  It is hoped that this study will be used to promote further 
research in order maintenance policing within police departments as means to deal with 
serious crime versus continually perpetuating the views and strategies exercised by the 
reform model. 
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APPENDEX 1 
 
 
LVMPD NWAC JURISDICTION MAP 
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APPENDEX 2 
 
 
LVMPD BAC JURISDICTION MAP 
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